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`Economics' of prosperity: Why the dominant perspectives may 
be unhelpful to make sense of underdevelopment  
  
Introduction  
  
 
“India is still recovering from a bad case of old-fashioned socialism1 …”  
  
When I was asked to write a book -review on Professor Vijay Joshi’s recent work (India's Long Road: The  
Search for Prosperity), I had never written one before. How could one comment in less than 1000 words 
(specified limit for most publications) a comprehensive scholarly work that runs into over four hundred 
pages (and lists nearly 500 works in its bibliography)? But I was assured I could learn. This meant my 
supervisors were flexible with time (and perhaps with the ‘quality’ of output). To begin with the learning  
exercise, I read a few reviews of the book. In searching for reviews, I came across a lecture which the  
author had delivered at a prominent university department2. The above quote comes from the lecture. 
Paradoxically, the author himself suggests that only three countries – South Korea, Taiwan and more 
recently China – have had rapid and sustained economic growth for three decades (Chapter. 1). I say 
paradoxically because in all the three cases, including in recent cases of rapid economic growth such as 
Vietnam, there have been elements of so -called socialism as the states have played roles far greater 
than that of the oft-prescribed gatekeeper and night-watchman. In fact, they continue to play an active 
part in enabling structural transformation. Other late-developers such as Germany and Japan have had 
(and continue to have) similar orders. The kind of role the respective states have played in the three 
countries (e.g. the active and broad-based industrial policy) is too well-documented to overlook3. At the 
risk of oversimplification, it appears meaningful to contend that policies around growth and 
development have usually been about a mix of both ‘socialist’ and ‘non-socialist’ ideals. The two models 
of governance, if you will, have barely functioned as silos.  
  
This article is mostly a book-review but I take a slightly revisionist approach across several generally 
accepted conventions, for example, the length (the article goes well-beyond the 1000-word convention). 
The ‘deviation’ from rules, however, has specific objectives. I have critically analyzed Joshi’s work and in 
so doing include relevant evidence, debates and questions not just from economics but also from other 
disciplines such as history and political science.    
   
  
 
                                                          
1 The author delivering The Corden Lecture at the University of Melbourne, 2017 (Goerge, 2017) 
2 See (Goerge, 2017) 
3 See (Amsden, 1989; Amsden & Chu, 2003; Evans, 1995; Wade, 2004, Weiss, 2005)  
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Reviewing India’s Long Road  
  
What policies and reforms can put India on the path of rapid and sustained economic growth (or 
prosperity4)? The book sheds light on, not just the required policy initiatives and reforms (several 
critically impending5), but also the probable explanations underlying the suboptimal growth 
performance and development outcomes. The book is written for a wide audience – economists, 
policymakers and students - among others.  
  
Compared to sub 1 per cent economic growth between 1900 and 1950, India, a manifestly ‘free market’ 
economy then (an era where countries like the US, Japan and Germany used active Hamiltonian policies 
to build production transformation capabilities), achieved a rather commendable 3.5 per cent growth 
between 1950 and 1980. The economic growth in the three decades between 1950 and 1980 appears 
reasonable because India was constrained owing to factors like severe droughts, multiple wars and the 
most critical of all, the political challenge to keep a diverse society together. Maintaining political unity 
within the framework of a democracy has been an accomplishment6 and in fact serves as a model for 
other diverse nations. Joshi notes that the ‘Hindu growth’ (1950 - 1980) is suboptimal when compared 
to other developing countries (primarily Korea). India indeed could not achieve the same economic 
growth as Korea did but nor did countries like Pakistan or Philippines, then relatively advanced 
compared to Korea. For Joshi, explanations for the divergent path lie in factors like Korea’s initial 
conditions (greater literacy compared to countries like India for example, Chapter. 2), India’s statist 
command and control policies and regulations that produced inefficiencies as well as a general 
contempt for the price mechanism (Chapter. 2). While there were indeed differences in the initial 
conditions, such conditions did not come from nowhere and in fact the institutional processes that led to 
such conditions impact development outcomes. In fact, understanding the evolutionary process of 
institutions – societal and political – offers a credible window as to why similar policies (such as active 
industrial policies in both India and Pakistan) yielded such varying outcomes7. As a society, Korea has 
had a different path of evolution owing to, among other things, a deep and highly repressive Japanese 
colonialism8. The society and its institutions got so structured that subsidy-receivers (the firms) could be  
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Per capita income like a country like Portugal where the author posits that the national income is widely shared even the 
poorest have reasonable standards of living)  
5 Reforming public health for example (Chapter. 9) 
 
6 Historian Ramachandra Guha argues that while countries like Pakistan could not accommodate credible demands 
from powerful factions (such as on linguistic autonomy) and saw major conflicts, the shifting political equilibrium 
allowed numerous often warring factions to co-exist in India (not from the book, The New Indian Express, 2017) 
7 See (M. H. Khan & Blankenburg, 2009; Kohli, 1997) 
 
8 See Kohli (1997) 
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credibly disciplined to perform (or meet export targets set by planners9). Indeed, the dominant strand of 
economic analysis, often with which economics is considered synonymous with, considers itself a 
physical science and has been extremely apolitical and ahistorical and even if it dwells into history, much 
of it is rather superficial often bordering around sensationalism. India’s development outcomes (in 
metrics like the number of people below poverty line, Chapter 2) in the three decades of so-called 
‘Hindu’ growth, were not very encouraging. In explaining the suboptimal economic growth and the 
rather modest outcomes, Joshi contends that the state  -driven command and control policies - planning 
driven dominance of public undertakings (PSUs) in economic activities, licensing on entry, exit and 
investment and protectionist trade among others created inefficiencies and distortions. It appears that 
the several exogenous shocks - droughts and war in mid 1960s and droughts and war and quadrupling of 
oil prices in the 1970s among others – constrained sizably the capabilities of the state (captured well by 
Joshi’s previous work of which he is co-author10). The rise in oil prices resulted in rapid deterioration in 
terms of trade in 1979, also the point at which the structural break occurred.  
  
Professor Joshi attributes the structural break and the subsequent increase in economic growth to 
“marketization, hesitatingly first, explicitly then (Chapter. 2)”. The work, however, almost flatly ignores 
critical micro-meso-developments between 1950 and 1980 that have been instrumental in the 
emergence of many competitive sectors of today such as the automobiles, IT and pharmaceuticals 
(among the top export items). These are among the flagship sectors responsible significantly for India’s 
growth and development story as well as for India’s reputation as a sophisticated manufacturing hub. 
Public Sector Undertakings (or PSUs) like Bharat Electronics Limited, founded in 1954, functioned as a 
training ground for thousands of engineers11. The PSU churned out thousands of trained engineers and 
this essentially was the groundwork for turning Bangalore into the Technopolis of today (Evans, 1995). 
Others have stressed on how the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology (the IITs) and the Indian 
Institute of Management (the IIMs) graduates form the core human resource base in sectors like IT and 
manufacturing12. Both the IIT and the IIM are part of the Nehruvian legacy. The extremely competitive  
                                                          
9 See (Khan & Blankenburg, 2009)  
 
10 See (Joshi et al, 1998)  
 
11 See Evans (1995) 
12 See Rajan et al (2006) 
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automobile sector (India in FY16 has exported more cars than China13), it’s foundation was laid when in 
the 1980s, Suzuki was roped in for a joint-venture (JV). The JV became possible because the highest 
political leadership was committed for it while capable Indian bureaucrats were scouting for the 
potential partners (Khan, 2015). Maruti-Suzuki started off amid heavy protection (85% tariff) or a 
guaranteed domestic market though this was conditional upon time-bound local content requirements. 
Since then, the expansion in the automobile sector has led to development of credible linkages such as 
emergence of large number of world-class auto-component manufacturers (ibid.). Joshi’s work, much 
like the dominant ‘development and prosperity research’, fails to acknowledge that states, the most 
credible organized institution in a typical resource and capability starved society, are instrumental to 
societal learning, capability building and promotion of sectors with greater growth potential.  
Professor Joshi associates the late 1970s and early 1980s with the ‘unleashing of animal spirits’ or a 
period that saw relatively high economic growth compared to the past. This is in line with how most 
other economics research looks at the structural break issue in India14. The fundamental assumption 
(partially tenable indeed) is that relatively rapid economic growth will result into greater societal 
progress or development. As one of the repercussions of such premise, it would not be wrong to assume 
that the period since the late 1970s is assumed as one with relatively rapid growth and development. 
However, such broad-brush analysis cannot be trusted to capture wellbeing. Between late 1970s and 
mid 1980s, the phase, the so-called ‘animal spirits’ phase (Chapter. 4), saw almost 50,000 textile-sector 
workers lose their jobs in the textile city of Ahmedabad (Shani, 2007, Pp 37-41). Joblessness meant 
widespread deprivation became a norm as the other sectors (mostly informal services or odd-jobs) 
fetched the workers a quarter of what they earned in textiles (ibid.). Recently, the demonetization in 
India has wreaked havoc on the informal sector workers. Bear in mind that over 80% of the workers in 
India are in the informal sector. Despite the misery among workers in sectors like construction that 
employs millions, the recent economic survey neither has aggregate data nor cases-studies on the 
hardships faced by the largely voiceless workers (Economic Survey, 2018). If the issues concerning 
majority workers remain invisible, can solely the current order of ‘economics and economists’ guided 
policy processes be relied upon to solve societal challenges? Indeed the ‘omission’ could be driven by 
factors such as political considerations (as perhaps is the case with India and its current regime’s 
demonetization shock). Imminent is a major rejig in the way development policy is guided and 
researched upon. Reading economic growth rates and considering it a proxy for wellbeing is 
problematic. Hence, more initiatives like the reassessing the measurement dynamics of societal progress 
(See Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009) are critically impending.  
                                                          
13 See Kulkarni (2016) 
14 See Rajan et al (2006) and Rodrik & Subramanian (2004) 
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The 1990s liberalization occurred amid a major fiscal crisis where IMF credit support was conditional on 
reforms – inter alia, devaluation, tariff reduction and elimination of quantitative restrictions on essential 
imports such as machinery, and delicensing (Chapter 4). The 1990s saw over 5.5% growth fueled by 
rising, more stable investments and greater production efficiency driven by smooth imports of required 
inputs. The 2000s, specifically the 2003-2010 phase has registered the fastest growth so far, over 8%, in 
line with global buoyancy and largely via heavy firm level borrowing and increased corporate savings 
and investments. Beginning in 2011 and exacerbated by the global financial meltdown, the growth has 
slowed down at 5% on average amid declining corporate investment. The book argues that this occurred 
because of deleveraging among corporates and governance failures such as scandals (Chapter 4).  
  
Dr. Joshi argues that despite the ingredients – macroeconomic stability, no serious conflicts and non-
extractive governance - among others, India grapples with suboptimal growth and development (jobless 
growth and severe underemployment). Creating good-quality jobs is certainly a complex yet urgent 
challenge for every society (Andreoni et al, 2016). Most economic research contends that India has 
missed the labour-intensive industrialisation bus and in explaining this, economists including Professor 
Joshi have attributed factors like, inter alia, India’s restrictive labour laws. The ‘restrictive labour law 
line’ of research while widely cited has also been recently contested15. On the other hand, much of those 
employed are in the informal sector. Despite churning out half the industrial output (Chapter. 5), the 
informal sector workers (over 80% of those employed are in the informal sector), other than being 
miserably paid, are vulnerable and voiceless in an order where a disproportionate extremely unfair value 
share is captured by capital. The current exploitative order that has persisted rather dangerously in 
India, perhaps solely benefits capital albeit only in the short-termist narrow sense. The adverse rent 
seeking dynamics perhaps explain the burgeoning inequality16 and the fact the major capitalist houses in 
1947 continue to be so.  
 
 
Dr. Joshi rightly contends that India continues to experience largely jobless growth because of its 
inability to expand labour-intensive manufacturing and in this, the principal constraints are, – inter alia, 
poor quality physical infrastructure, lack of credible skills among workers, poor SME finance access, 
minimally conducive business environment (corrupt tax officials) and the employment protection laws 
(that require firms above a certain size to obtain permission for, inter alia, laying off workers, Chapter 6). 
On whether credible industrial policy interventions are a potential policy measure, the author suggests 
that such interventions – ‘requires a smart, dispassionate and benevolent state which can ‘pick winners’ 
- (See Chapter. 6). Professor Joshi goes on to argue that countries like India should avoid the primrose 
path of such policies because such policies have a thin ‘empirical case’ (Chapter 6). Joshi’s brief insight 
on industrial policy is extremely narrow and in fact reflects a superficial understanding of dynamics like 
industrial policy driven learning. For example, India’s real exchange rate has appreciated by nearly over 
20 per cent since 2014 and this has sizably hurt exports. While Joshi does highlight this issue around the 
appreciation (Chapter 8), he perhaps is not aware that, in fact, preventing real exchange rate 
appreciation (among other exchange rate management strategies) is itself a major industrial policy tool  
                                                          
15 See Bardhan (2015) 
16 See Rangarajan et al (2018) 
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(as argued by equally if not more illustrious economists, See Guzman, Ocampo, & Stiglitz, 2017). Perhaps 
Joshi’s áversion’ to industrial policy stems from an ideological (so-called free markets guided by the 
invisible hand) and normative epistemological standing which contradict his own philosophical premise 
that dispassionate and objective (read rational) approaches are almost always desirable (as Dr. Joshi 
argues that states should not intervene for example via an industrial policy because they may not be 
dispassionate, smart and objective).  
While there have been modest improvements, India continues to fare poorly in critical development 
outcomes such as nutrition and infant and maternal mortality. India’s performance compares poorly to 
several of its regional peers who have significantly lower per capita incomes. This contention, though 
debated by a few citing technical grounds17 is widely agreed upon including in this work (Chapter 9). 
Professor Joshi insightfully dwells into how public health interventions such as immunization, basic 
sanitation, nutrition and other preventive and promotional healthcare measures – which impact overall 
health outcomes significantly, are largely neglected and underfunded (less than 10% of state health 
expenditure, Chapter 9). Indeed the Dr. Joshi links the appalling outcomes to the weak preventive and 
promotional public health services. In explaining this, the author delves into history as well as political 
economy contending that it was the powerful medical lobby that got public health merged into medical 
services (Pp. 189). In what is a display of his erudition, Dr. Joshi evidences that Tamilnadu, which has 
much better health and overall development outcomes, bucked the broader trend by retaining a 
dedicated public health service. For a host of reasons including an inappropriate incentive structure, 
medical services, associated largely with curative health, addresses only partially the overall health-
related challenges.    
   
 
16 See (Rangarajan & Dev, 2018)  
17 Economists like Bhagwati suggest limitations in the way infant mortality rates in countries like Bangladesh are computed  
(Bhagwati & Panagariya, 2013). Despite ‘technical arguments’, there is consensus that social underdevelopment and  
multidimensional deprivations are widespread in India. 
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Widespread multidimensional deprivation has been common in India despite dozens of targeted 
subsidies and welfare programs. While welfare entitlements like income guarantees have indeed played 
a role in tackling extreme deprivation and hunger, chronic poverty is rampant. Nearly half the labor 
force is into low productivity agriculture and over 200 million people are below the poverty line (Chapter 
10). The author proposes a universal basic income (UBI), which raises average incomes to the poverty 
line. This is indeed a commendable prescription (Chapter 10). UBI, the author estimates, will require 
funding at around 4 per cent of the GDP and that the fiscal space can be created by freeing up resources 
from existing subsidy programs, whose effectiveness, as has been documented widely, has been widely 
questioned18. In building the case for UBI, Professor Joshi evidences that targeted subsidies such as the 
Public Distribution System (PDS, subsidized food grains) have been utter failures in terms of providing 
reprieve to the poorest. In fact, the targeted subsidies, a significant chunk, is exploited by unintended 
beneficiaries (though this lot perhaps is not necessarily well-off) often by diverting grains to the black 
market (Chapter 10). The author documents cases like Chhatisgarh where over 90% households are 
enlisted as Below Poverty Line (BPL) while the number of BPL cards issued exceeds the overall 
population. The section on UBI indeed documents the failures of targeted subsidies but (perhaps the 
mark of a credible academician) it does not shy away from highlighting intricacies in devising public 
policy and how policy outcomes can be non-linear and unpredictable. In Tamilnadu, unlike Chattisgarh, 
the leakages in targeted PDS are less than 10 per cent. The author evidences complexities in other 
welfare programs like National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREGA) where there are inefficiencies 
such as delayed payments but it has benefitted the poorest due to the program’s attributes’ such as 
selfselection where only the poorest turn-up asking for work.  
To tackle the leakages in targeted PDS, Professor Joshi suggests replacing the multitude of subsidies with 
Aadhar (National Biometric Identity Card) linked cash transfers. Indeed, and as Joshi notes, India has the 
technology to implement cash transfers. On resources, the author rightly argues that subsidies - on 
fertilizer, coal, electricity and railway fares – largely benefit the thriving and often promote, for instance, 
unsustainable overuse. The author estimates that non-merit subsidies are roughly 12%, of the GDP and 
that resources can be freed up to finance the UBI (Chapter 10). However, the proposition that non-merit 
subsidies can be reduced to fund a UBI, indeed a reasonable proposal which has been proposed 
repeatedly19, raises a host of fundamental questions. Subsidies such as in fertilizer or agriculture being  
 
                                                          
18  See (Sen, A. 2014)  
 
19 See Economic Survey (2018) 
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tax-free, are essentially rents and redistribution mechanisms to powerful factions and classes which can 
destabilize the regime20. The rents, distributed through legal as well as non-legal means, fuel the 
patronage network and ensure their loyalty21. The rents are a necessary element to ensure the political 
equilibrium, in absence of which there may not be political stability22. If we go by the dynamics 
comprehensively outlined by the World Development Report 2017, the subsidies are here to stay till 
major structural transformation takes place where there are several competitive sectors that enable 
arms-length based functioning. After all, several governments have come and gone by but the 
competitive clientelist order, certain variants of which do produce growth enhancing stability, remains 
intact23.  
It was felt, perhaps rightly, that the current BJP government has the mandate to tread difficult paths and 
implement difficult decisions unlike a typical coalition government with, inter alia ideological 
differences. However, the actual policy paths taken (such as hasty adoption of demonetization) as well 
as the outcomes (often owing to poor designs such as in the GST) have been somewhat divergent often 
disappointing than anticipated. The difficulties in disbanding several unwanted subsidies on welfare 
programs have multiple dimensions and complexities when it comes to design or actual implementation. 
A particularly relevant paradigm that enables a greater understanding of how societal, economic and 
political distribution of power affects policy design and outcomes is the political settlements (PS) theory. 
The PS theory24 argues that it stability in developing societies is largely a function of allocation of rents 
to the most powerful factions (with mobilization and hence destabilizing capabilities) and that the 
political equilibrium eventually is set at the actual distribution of power rather than what formal 
mechanisms (such as being a state) confers. Indeed, that policy designs and outcomes are significantly 
determined on distribution of power and the political settlements has been widely accepted25. In this 
sense, technocratic physical science like estimations based on hyperbolic assumptions serve no purpose 
when it comes to application. To the readers dismay, Joshi’s work is largely of the physical sciences type 
where economists with a specific ‘orientation’ if you will do not find political and sociological 
explanations objective enough (and ‘quantifiable’ enough).  
                                                          
20 See Khan (2017) 
21 See KELSALL (2018) 
22 World Bank (2017) 
23 See (P. Bardhan, 2015; Pranab Bardhan, 2010; Pranab Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000 
24 See (KELSALL, 2018; M. H. Khan, 2010, 2012)  
 
25 See (UNIDO, 2016; World Bank, 2017)  
 
 Economics of ‘prosperity’: Why unhelpful| Avinash Gupta 
This is not to suggest that the author does not delve into the more realistic side of affairs. Welcome as it 
is, the author, in the concluding chapter (Chapter 13) contends that the BJP should not toe the line of 
the RSS (BJP’s parent organization) as doing so runs the risk of not just curtailment of individual 
freedoms but also the imposition of majoritarian tyranny. Indeed (and with the benefit of hindsight), if 
one goes by statements26 (perhaps aspirations) made by most BJP legislators (including the PM and ones  
with Ivy-league training in economics), one gets a sense that not everything is alright when it comes to 
stability and progress in India.  
   
  
To sum up…  
  
For India’s continental size and numerous heterogeneities across, for example, among the states and 
their levels of economic and institutional development, it is indeed a challenge for any scholar to 
provide an aggregate macro policy perspective and at the same time, cater to numerous non-
uniformities. In this sense, the book, with nearly 500 works in the bibliography, does well to address 
several questions it outlines. However, and as can be established from Hume’s law, no normative 
prescription is derived from a positive analysis unless there is a normative idea as an assumption. It is for 
the readers to infer for themselves the normative assumptions in this extremely useful scholarly work.  
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